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Revolting (Against) Violence  
in Michael Haneke’s Funny Games U.S.
The question is not: “What am I allowed to show?” but  rather: 
“What chance do I  give the  viewer to  recognize what it  is I  am 
showing?” The question—limited to the topic of VIOLENCE—is not: 
“How do I show violence?” but rather: “How do I show the viewer 
his [or her] own position vis-à-vis violence and its portrayal?” 
Haneke, “Violence and the Media” 579.
excessive images
Among the various norms that contemporary mainstream 
cinema has been eagerly transgressing, the limits of violence—
either justified or not—happen to be challenged more intensely 
than ever before. Perhaps no other artistic medium has man-
aged to deploy so profoundly the dogma which psychoanalysis 
stubbornly refers to: a subject’s pursuit of excessive and Thanatic 
pleasure we know as jouissance. Yet, mainstream cinema rarely 
conspires with desires or the real and its traumatic experiences 
of emptiness; Hollywood, as a construct, cautiously trudges across 
the realms of fantasies instead. If violence is eagerly cherished 
and exercised there, then it is mostly because the films them-
selves refrain from inflicting violence on spectators, preserving 
their bloodthirsty images in impermeable bubbles. Spectacles 
of violence proliferate insofar as they are kept at a safe distance, 
which makes it possible to turn them into the harmless conditions 
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is overcome altogether. As constituents of more complex fanta-
sies, representations of violence satisfy the compensatory needs 
of the spectators, construct their either collective or individual 
identities, and contribute to the middle-class myths demanded 
in the “risk society” (be it those of modern super heroes, self-made 
men, or survivors). At the same time, these bloodthirsty fantasies 
put scholars in a suspicious position; as Patricia Pisters notes, 
critics way too often tend to either perceive such tropes as mere 
aesthetical devices or lock them up within a moral framework, 
eschewing any considerations concerning their form (Pisters 80).1 
Neither moral nor aesthetic reductionism provides an insight into 
the intricacies of violence with regard to its political, social, artistic, 
or affective circulation.
A remake of Michael Haneke’s seminal film, Funny Games U.S. 
seems to resist such a clear-cut binary and criticizes immensely 
the mainstream representations of violence. For Haneke, as he 
states briefly in a short essay devoted to the brutality depicted 
onscreen, cinematic violence can be divided into three predomi-
nant categories. First, be it in horror, science fiction, or Westerns, 
it functions in separation from the experiences of the spectator. 
Such a suspension of disbelief makes it possible for him or her 
to identify with the protagonists and yet reside at a safe distance. 
Second, in films concerned with terrorism, crime, or war—that 
is, issues far more realistic and palpable for the spectator—vio-
lence turns into a “liberating and positive” event providing one 
with a solution to the particular impasse. In this respect, vio-
lence might become an exaggerated allegorization of mundane 
struggles or a re-familiarization of an exceptional danger, which 
in either case meets a comforting closure at the end of the film. 
The last one, inherent in the postmodern cinema, incorporates 
violence into satire or as a joke (Haneke, “Violence and the Media” 
576–577). What should be noticed is the fact that this incorpora-
tion of mockery in violence hardly suspends the latter; although 
the inherent displacement of postmodern cinema might result 
in ingenious strategies capable of deconstructing the ways 
1. Importantly enough, Pisters as a Deleuzian scholar follows an entirely 
























in which cinematic images thrive on brutality, it also contributes 
immensely to these representations.
This article aims at reading Haneke’s Funny Games U.S. as a pro-
test against the violence employed in the mainstream cinema. 
As I will argue, by confronting its spectators with unbearable 
cruelty devoid of closing catharsis, Funny Games U.S. challenges 
the clichés Haneke enumerates in his essay. At the same time, 
it resorts to affective violence against the spectators, exposing 
them to defamiliarized images of brutality and unmasking their 
bloodthirsty desire for retaliation. In other words, they become 
the very reason for the violence on screen. Following, among 
others, Jean-Luc Nancy and Henry A. Giroux, I would like to dem-
onstrate how Haneke exhausts the norm of acceptable violence 
to reinstate such a limit anew.
depraving pleasure
Funny Games U.S. is a remake of an Austrian thriller of the same 
name, which this time manages to overcome the inevitable flaw 
of the original picture that has distanced the object of Haneke’s 
criticism—that is, the American(ized) mainstream cinema—from 
the form of the film: the barrier of language and the actors’ 
recognition. The beginning of Funny Games U.S. connotes a well-
known structure of a worn-out and conventional thriller targeted 
at a white, middle-class, and heterosexual spectator (perhaps 
an instance of the masculine gaze). A happy couple, George 
and Ann Farber, are riding out of town with their little son, Georgie, 
to spend a relaxing weekend by the lake. Suddenly, the idyllic image 
of jokes and guessing games is interrupted with the cacophonic 
saxophone of John Zorn and the harsh growls of Naked City. After 
their arrival, the family recognizes that something really disturb-
ing is happening to their friends, accompanied by two strangers, 
who, dressed in white, conjure up the image of the gang members 
in Stanley Kubrick’s A Clockwork Orange. When the Farbers return 
to the house they have rented to make themselves comfortable, 
both men—having introduced themselves as Peter and Paul—visit 
them in order to, as they claim, borrow some eggs. Unfortunately, 
the unexpected visitors become more and more intrusive with every 























them another two, they play with George’s expensive golf clubs 
without his permission, and they drown the telephone in a sink 
full of water. Furious, Ann orders her husband to kick Peter 
and Paul out of their house. Having achieved nothing and facing 
only mockery and laughter instead, George slaps Paul in the face. 
This gesture commences the spiral of violence which will last until 
the end of Funny Games U.S.; Paul grabs a golf club and breaks 
George’s leg with it, forcing the Farbers to accept a gruesome bet—
they have to survive until the next morning. From this moment 
on, Haneke’s work imposes on its spectators excessive images 
of torture, mutilation, injury, and eventually murder.
By no means is Haneke interested in moving or transgress-
ing the acceptable norms of visual representations of cruelty. 
Indeed, the way his protagonists contribute to the excessive 
images of violence poses the question of what can be shown 
on screen and unmasks the arbitrariness of this division. Still, 
as he admits himself, these are secondary issues; rather, Haneke 
aims at uncovering the spectators’ position towards the brutal 
spectacle of Funny Games U.S. (Haneke, “Violence and the Media” 
578–579). The reason for that stems from the strive for such 
an aesthetic of violence that resists being subsumed under 
any of the voyeuristic categories he diagnoses in contemporary 
cinema, be it identification, liberation, or postmodernist mockery. 
With regard to Zygmunt Bauman’s idea of fatigue with violence, 
Henry A. Giroux argues that 
[h]yper-violence and  spectacular representations of  cruelty disrupt 
and block our ability to respond politically and ethically to the violence 
as it is actually happening on the ground. In this instance, unfamiliar 
violence such as extreme images of torture and death becomes banally 
familiar, while familiar violence that occurs daily is barely recognized, 
becoming if not boring then relegated to the realm of the unnoticed 
and unnoticeable. (Giroux 39)
Such a transition is founded on what Giroux calls the “depravity 
of aesthetics” (Giroux 31), which intertwines the proliferation 
of violence and its obscene representations with the biopoliti-
cal apparatus of “collective pleasure” and “instant gratification.” 
Although it is not my intention to examine whether Giroux’s argu-
























it eventually states, the depravity of aesthetics—understood 
as a practice of looking—neatly corresponds to Haneke’s strategy. 
The mode of reception theorized by Giroux situates the spectator 
in the bubble, where his or her unreachable position makes it possible 
to join the excess of violence with transgressive pleasure, jouissance 
as Jacques Lacan would have it.2 Since the aesthetics of violence 
and its norms constantly expand, absorbing and accumulating 
more and more obscene representations, violence has to be over-
loaded in a different manner. It has to be defamiliarized in such 
a way that contributes equally to the recognition and unfamiliarity 
of brutality and, at the same time, does not locate it as some-
thing inaccessible or abstract. As I will demonstrate further on, 
Haneke attempts to include the spectator in his film, assuming 
that his or her participation in the spectacle blurs the boundar-
ies of the familiar and the unfamiliar. When the spectator turns 
out to be incapable of situating himself or herself at a safe dis-
tance, indifference can hardly be upheld, whereas the voyeuristic 
transformation of violence into pleasure is blocked. Haneke still 
operates within the framework of responding to sadistic impulses; 
however, instead of gratifying them, he uncovers the bloodthirsty 
agenda lurking behind. 
suspending violence
In Funny Games U.S., the scenes of cruel torture and ruthless 
killings are entangled in the ongoing masquerade, during which 
swapping roles, theatrical gestures, and temporary identities desta-
bilize the seemingly fixed positions of the perpetrators and their 
victims, and tamper with the motivations behind the carnage. 
Whereas the Farbers seem to fit in the convention of a popular 
thriller, Peter and Paul do not belong there. They are dressed 
in plain white clothes, more suitable for members of a pantomime 
2. Todd McGowan claims that jouissance “marks a disturbance in the ordinary 
symbolic functioning of the subject, and the subject inevitably suffers its 
enjoyment. One cannot simply integrate one’s enjoyment into the other 
aspects of one’s daily life because it always results from the injection 
of a foreign element—the real—into this life. […] The subject cannot simply 
























group than a couple of psychopathic murderers, and wear white 
gloves. As their appearances are highly depersonalized, and even 
the props themselves enable them not to leave any fingerprints 
at the crime scene, it is emphasized that both men are deprived 
of any fixed identity. Peter and Paul juggle with different stories 
about themselves, constantly undermining or denying things 
they have said before, and they turn most conversations into 
mockery. Furthermore, even their names—or nicknames—are 
not permanent; both men regularly change the way they call 
themselves, for instance, Tom and Jerry or Beavis and Butthead. 
If we bear that in mind, the choice of murder weapons—golf club, 
knife, and shotgun—surprises us even less. These props, just 
as the aforementioned nicknames, point to the emblematic car-
toons that present irrational violence deprived of consequences. 
Therefore, if Haneke pinpoints the identities of Peter and Paul, 
then it is the identity of the American(ized) film industry with its 
insatiable hunger for violence that contributes to the state Giroux 
recognizes. This last remark might prove why Haneke decided 
to remake Funny Games in the first place. Funny Games U.S. does 
not provide any ground-breaking elements in comparison to its 
predecessor; quite the contrary, it purposefully uses the very same 
locations and props (Monk 426–427). The difference lies in employ-
ing well-known actors, whose status does not grant them any form 
of immunity to cruelty and painful death, and using English—that 
is, the language of the mainstream violence—in order to narrow 
the distance between Haneke’s critical toolbox and the object 
of his criticism.
Temporary identities are accompanied by the inversion of hier-
archies and orders organizing the brutal realm of Funny Games 
U.S. As has been hinted at above, canonical thrillers or slasher 
films would most probably end with a closing catharsis, marking 
the reunion of the victims and the punishment of the perpetra-
tors. Such a resolution would provide us with sui generis working 
through particular higher values. In other words, such violence 
would belong to Haneke’s second category, being the “positive 
or liberating” one. In Funny Games U.S., not only do the Farbers 
lose their bet and are murdered by Peter and Paul, but also Paul 
























again. Moreover, these genre-oriented inversions—if not the ethical 
ones—coexist with the blurred distinctions into victims and perpe-
trators. On a superficial level, this relation is straightforward, as it 
is organized by the gruesome bet and the asymmetry it entails; 
however, the deeper level of this film is furnished with interpreta-
tive twists. Although Peter and Paul kill the Farbers’ dog before 
they are confronted by the furious family, George and Ann are 
unaware of this fact; hence, despite the fact that both men 
in white are intrusive, it is George who resorts to physical violence 
first, when he slaps one of them in his face. Further on, Peter 
and Paul agree that they equally suffer from the situations they 
are in as the Farbers do. Deprived of motivations, the perpetra-
tors claim that there is neither an inspiration nor a cause behind 
their actions; instead, their deeds stem directly from boredom 
and an existence devoid of any sense.
Even though Peter and Paul’s denials might be read as yet 
another eponymous game, the inclusion of the spectator in the film 
might suggest otherwise, exposing to what extent both men 
remain highly determined characters. Funny Games U.S. cher-
ishes breaking the fourth wall, since both men tend to recognize 
the presence of the spectator: they blink, emphasizing the arbitrari-
ness of the whole spectacle of cruelty, they ask him or her about 
the expected result of the bet, finally, they accuse the spectator 
of supporting the other side—the family. As Roy Grundmann 
suggests, the manner in which both realities interweave does 
not necessarily pose the spectator as a witness or a participant 
of the carnage, but rather incorporates him or her as the cause 
of violence (Grundmann 28). Paul reminds us of it when he stares 
at the camera and ominously asks whether he should disclose 
the real ending of this film. This is the first time when his face 
covers the screen entirely. Consequently, it becomes a mirror 
in which the faces of the spectator and the perpetrator meet, 
breaking the safe distance and appropriating the outside into 
the expanding space of the film. Haneke’s space of suffering 
is the realm in which the perpetrators turn out to be determined, 
as they merely respond to the most hidden Thanatic fantasies 
of the bloodthirsty audience; Peter and Paul reflect themselves 























aesthetics. The same aesthetic gesture is repeated in the final 
scene of Funny Games U.S.; this time, covering the screen once 
again, Paul presents his terrifying manifesto: “You will be next.” 
Yet, is it indeed Paul speaking, threatening the spectator who now 
must confront the fact that representations of violence transgress 
its visual content and affectively transform the audience—just 
as Giroux has it? Or, perhaps, is this the hidden voice of the specta-
tor—reflected in Paul’s face—who identifies the objects of his or her 
bloodthirsty desires anew? Those people—although not known 
yet—might already be the addressees of wrath and blind retali-
ation, of boredom or hollow existence. Or, does it really matter 
at all whether this charge of the death drive leaves the screened 
reality or not, if we bear in mind its affective potential?
violence hates games?
Funny Games U.S. is predominantly about playing; still, the epon-
ymous games do not boil down exclusively to bets, counting rhymes, 
or guessing games, which Peter and Paul force the Farbers to accept 
and take part in. Turning violence into a ruthless game in which 
the perpetrators play with their victims, as the film medium sus-
pends responsibility, also does not exhaust the title of Haneke’s 
work. If we bear in mind that spielen in German encompasses 
a broader range of meanings than a game, we can assume that 
Funny Games U.S. is about a playing a different sort of game: 
namely, acting (Peucker 136–137). It is the idea of acting, sewing 
together both realities of Funny Games U.S., that entails the arbi-
trariness of defamiliarizing violence onscreen and disallowing one 
to naturalize it. Since ‘games’ are so well-furnished in meanings 
and references, Haneke’s film interestingly corresponds to Jean-Luc 
Nancy’s reading of violence and visuality, in which the philosopher 
claims that “Violence does not play the game of forces. It does 
not play at all. Violence hates games, all games; it hates the inter-
vals, the articulations, the tempo, the rules governed by nothing 
but the pure relations among themselves” (17). As Nancy argues, 
violence yearns for being shown, or for showing off; it demands 
to be—monstrously—demonstrated and turned into its own image, 
since any other relations—or rules—are already exhausted. Either 
























of its own rage” (16), or “[a] pure, dense, stupid, impenetrable 
intensity” (17). By no means does it imply that violence avoids 
partaking in any social constructions or cultural spectacles aiming 
to institutionalize it; quite the opposite, the symbolic inclusion 
and regulation of violence—in arts, sports, or state control, to name 
a few instances—proves its empty form that demands to be 
shown, made present, and represented. These instances turn 
out to be discursive sites that re-negotiate the spectrum of violence 
with the faint recognition that violence, being after all a transgres-
sive event, neither is interested in establishing limits nor respects 
them. As the authoritarian and totalitarian states demonstrate 
it most explicitly, violence has to be shown: it “always completes 
itself in an image” (Nancy 20). Nancy continues: “If no image can 
exist without tearing apart a closed intimacy or a non-disclosed 
immanence, and if no image can exist without plunging into a blind 
depth—without world or subject—then it must also be admitted 
that not only violence but the extreme violence of cruelty hovers 
at the edge of the image, of all images” (24). The congruence vio-
lence bears with image, or image with violence, allows us to think 
of Haneke’s picture differently. Precisely, perhaps one should set 
aside the violent representations onscreen to focus on the affec-
tive violence that Funny Games U.S. inflicts on the spectator. After 
all, violence is but a destructive event. Since the representations 
of cruelty do not exhaust relations as they are incorporated into 
a greater machinery of identification and compensation, then 
the violence they present is suspended. The desperate protest 
against its ubiquity and boredom has to be therefore spurred 
by employing the intensities of the image that shatter relations, 
disturb one’s boundaries, and set limits of perception anew. Let 
us consider two instances of such violence.
One of the means Haneke uses in order to puncture the stable 
boundaries of the spectator is to entangle him or her in the play 
of noise and silence. Encouraged by his parents, Georgie man-
ages to flee and hides in a nearby house. His escape cannot be 
left unnoticed, and one of the perpetrators decides to pursue 
him. Convinced that he has found the boy, he inserts the Naked 
City record in a hi-fi set, playing the opening track of Funny 























more seconds and then ends. Although the harsh soundtrack 
and the tension it creates might suggest otherwise, young Georgie 
is spared and brought back to his parents the very moment one 
is convinced of his imminent death. He will be killed in the least 
expected moment, when the sudden gunshot tears the calmness 
of another scene, a filler of sort, focused on Peter looking into 
a fridge for something to eat. These two scenes are employed 
to deconstruct the expectations of the spectator, surprising him 
or her for the first time with mercy when both the film reaches its 
arguable climax and death is most plausible, and for the second 
time—with a murder that occurs unexpectedly. Cruelty takes place 
in silence. After her son is killed, Ann turns off the bloodstained 
TV set and begins to mourn. In the realm of TV entertainment, 
brutal scenes of death lack their counterpart in grief that, just like 
suffering, occurs in silence. Naked City with its harshness of vocals 
and shrieks of the saxophone provocatively signals those exces-
sive moments which are unbearable in the realm of the brutalized 
film industry: a quiet lack of violence. Conversely, it is silence that 
disturbs the boundaries of the spectator and transforms itself 
into a powerful affective means. 
Haneke’s Funny Games U.S. not only reveals the bloodthirsty 
expectations of the spectators, but also deconstructs their yearn 
for retaliation, unmasking the arbitrariness behind this impulse. 
After her child is murdered, Ann is desperate for either survival 
or revenge; she manages to grab a shotgun and fatally wounds 
Peter. Panicked, Paul picks up the remote control, rewinds the scene 
before Ann came into possession of the weapon, and prevents 
her from doing so. Therefore, the spectacle manifests itself 
as determined and well-planned; when a happy ending is no lon-
ger a possibility, what remains at stake is only the time in which 
the scenes of the fixed sequence will take place. As Leland Monk 
suggests, one might be tempted to wonder why Ann does not pick 
up the remote control herself and rewind the film to the much safer 
circumstances; this is, however, pointless (Monk 425). For rewinding 
is incapable of going beyond the opening scene in which the Farbers 
are already on the move and are bound to meet Peter and Paul, 
the only way to save them is to kill the perpetrators when they are 
























neously, such a hypothetical re-position—motivated by empathy 
towards the victims—would contribute to the justified and positive 
violence of the second category; yet, in light of such a dramatic 
rewinding of the film, victims are not yet victims, whereas Peter 
and Paul’s brutality is yet to come. Monk’s observation proves 
that the fatal position of the characters depends predominantly 
on the inevitability of violence; the spectator might be tempted 
to support retaliation at any cost which, in an extreme case, might 
turn the Farbers into the perpetrators within an atemporal pro-
jection when there is nobody to be avenged. At best, the scene 
with the remote control evokes sympathy and regret that Ann 
has not managed to kill the murderers of her son. In either case, 
the plot of Funny Games U.S. demonstrates that supporting 
the Farbers is hardly separable from, a more or less conscious, 
yearning for committing violence against Peter and Paul.
Delving into the congruence of violence and image suggested 
by Nancy, these two scenes put forward not only the images 
of violence, but also the images as violence, bringing Haneke’s 
Funny Games U.S. closely to the cinema of intersection, theorized 
by Todd McGowan. McGowan claims that
the deeper problem with  Hollywood’s fantasies lies in  their failure 
to envision the impossible as such. Hollywood remains in the domain 
of  the  possible, even when it  colors this domain with  the  image 
of impossibility. Hollywood’s escapist films, for the most part, belong 
to  the  cinema of  integration rather than the  cinema of  intersection 
because they transform the impossible object into an ordinary object. 
Cinema truly realizes its radical potential when it treats the ordinary 
object as an impossible one. (McGowan 165)
If we revise the brutal representations of the mainstream cinema 
Haneke criticizes, we should note that they belong to the cinema 
of incorporation as well; in each of the three instances of cinematic 
violence he mentions, excessive brutality is eventually reduced 
to an element that does not break the integrity of the subject 
but fulfills a particular fantasy instead: violence is kept at a distance, 
prevented from taking place, stopped from spreading, or suspended 
by mockery. The significance of Funny Games U.S, however, does 
not lie entirely in its critique of how the mainstream cinema deploys 























violence on the spectator, reaching this elusive element that resists 
being absorbed in a fantasy. For McGowan, the gaze inherent 
in the cinema of intersection is a means of political activism that 
engenders the liberation of a subject. This sense of freedom 
is understood entirely in psychoanalytical terms, nonetheless; 
it marks the traumatic event that breaks the confines of ideology 
in favor of reaching the emptiness of the object of one’s desire. 
McGowan adds:
Through enacting a  traumatic encounter with  the  gaze, this cinema 
shows us that we can do the impossible. At the moment we encounter 
the gaze, we see the field of representation thrown into relief and rede-
fined. Everything outside of the gaze loses its former significance in light 
of this encounter. Through this cinematic experience, we can glimpse 
the impossible. We see the filmic world from the perspective of the gaze 
rather than seeing the gaze from the perspective of the filmic world 
(as occurs in the cinema of integration). After this encounter, the normal 
functioning of the world cannot continue in the same way and undergoes 
a radical transformation. Though we can accomplish the impossible, we 
can’t do so without simultaneously destroying the very ground beneath 
our feet. (McGowan 177)
 McGowan’s observation reveals the psychoanalytic potential 
of Haneke’s Funny Games U.S.; its play with convention, expecta-
tions, the roles of victims and perpetrators, or the safety of the film 
screen that exposes the elements that hardly belong to its reality 
and disturb the viewing practices of the spectator. At the same 
time, these practices detach violence from its social and generic 
superstructure. Rather, they reframe brutal and bloodthirsty 
images as an ungraspable intensity that is recurring onscreen over 
and over again in its imperative to be shown; yet, this loop-form 
barely leaves the spectator-subject unscathed. Inflicting violence 
on a spectator, Funny Games U.S. allows him or her to experience 
the real that punctures through the thin veil of Haneke’s picture. 
Precisely, it is the encounter of the spectator with a formless 
and brute violence manifested in a traumatic element that escapes 
the completeness of a filmed fantasy and the subject’s control.
abandoning frontiers
Adopting the spectacle of cruelty and suspending its limits, 
























against the disturbed norms of violence in the contemporary 
cinema and the growing apathy that intoxicates the spectators, 
which Henry A. Giroux’s depravity of aesthetics and Jean-Luc 
Nancy’s reflections on violence helped us conceptualize. Since 
cruelty on screen is easily captured in the processes of compensa-
tion and identification, as Haneke points out in his categorization 
of cinematic violence, it is not enough to confront the spectator 
with excessive violence and its representations. Haneke is forced 
to find a solution elsewhere; hence, his resistance to the status 
quo is oriented towards the most tragic means, that is, mobiliz-
ing the cinematic medium created for the spectators against 
them. Consequently, by means of structural twists and its play 
with convention, Haneke construes an affective machine capable 
of unmasking the bloodthirsty and voyeuristic fantasies that 
are projected on the film, and the depraved agenda behind 
them. The critical project Funny Games U.S. initiates and finds 
its affirmative counterpart in the affective violence inflicted 
on the spectator and breaking his or her safe position outside 
of the film. Therefore, it punctures the strategies of distance 
that are already at play. What is affirmed is such violence that 
is no longer a result of excessive representations, but rather one 
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